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1 Abstract 
Globalization critics are concerned that increased trade openness and foreign direct 
investment exacerbate existing economic disadvantages of women and foster 
conditions for forced labor. Defenders of globalization argue instead that as countries 
become more open and competition intensifies, discrimination against any group, 
including women, becomes more difficult to sustain and is therefore likely to recede. 
The same is argued with respect to forced labor. This article puts these competing 
claims to an empirical test. We find that countries that are more open to trade provide 
better economic rights to women and have a lower incidence of forced labor. This 
effect holds in a global sample as well as in a developing country sub-sample and 
holds also when potential feedback effects are controlled via instrumental variable 
regression. The extent of an economy’s ‘penetration’ by foreign direct investment has 
no statistically significant impact. Globalization might weaken the general bargaining 
position of labor such that outcome-related labor standards might suffer. However, 
being more open toward trade is likely to promote rather than hinder the realization of 
two labor rights considered as core or fundamental by the International Labour 
Organization, namely the elimination of economic discrimination and of forced labor. 
 
2 Introduction 
Feminists and women’s interest groups are concerned that globalization increases the 
existing economic disadvantage experienced by many women relative to men in most 
countries of the world (Afshar and Barrientos, 1999; Benería and Feldman, 1992; 
Çağatay, 1996; Elson and Pearson, 1989; Tinker, 1990; Visvanathan et al, 1997). 
Similarly, groups concerned about sex-slavery and non-governmental organizations 
with a focus on human rights and equitable development are concerned that the 
competitive pressures wrought by globalization increases the incidence of forced or 
compulsory labor (Bales, 1999; United Nations, 2000). What both groups have in 
common is the concern that globalization is detrimental for what are called core or 
fundamental labor rights. Others argue that these rights improve with increasing 
globalization (Bhagwati, 2004; Graham, 2000).  
The International Labour Organization (ILO) has declared four labor rights as 
core or fundamental, despite some dispute over exactly which standards should be 
included in this category. The ‘ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work’ commits all ILO members, not just parties to the ILO conventions, to 
promote and to realize 
 
(a) the effective abolition of child labor (ILO Conventions 138 and 182);  
(b) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining (enshrined in ILO Conventions 87 and 98); 
(c) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation 
(ILO Conventions 100 and 111); 
(d) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor (ILO Conventions 
29 and 105). 
3  
This is the third and final in a series of studies, in which the present authors 
examine the effect of globalization on fundamental labor rights. In Neumayer and De 
Soysa (2005), we demonstrate that countries that are more open to trade and are more 
strongly penetrated by foreign direct investment (FDI) have a lower incidence of child 
labor. In Neumayer and De Soysa (2006), we employ a new measure of free 
association and collective bargaining rights, finding that countries that are more open 
to trade have fewer violations of labor rights than more closed ones. The extent of an 
economy’s penetration by foreign direct investment has no statistically significant 
impact, however. 
In this article, we address the remaining fundamental labor rights, specifically 
those relating to economic discrimination against women and the incidence of forced 
or compulsory labor. Discrimination against women is of course not the only form of 
discrimination in respect of employment and occupation, but it is an issue with wide-
reaching consequences for development, since empowerment of women is widely 
seen to be an end and a means to development (Abu-Ghaida and Klasen, 2004). 
Moreover, the issue may now be addressed systematically since sufficiently well-
developed data exist. Equal pay for women for their work of equal value is also the 
explicit objective of the ILO’s Equal Renumeration Convention (No. 100) from 1951. 
The Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (No. 111) from 1958, 
on the other hand, is more general both in terms of substantive scope reaching beyond 
wage payments and in terms of groups of people covered. In addition to sex 
discrimination, this convention also prohibits discrimination based on race, color, 
political opinion, nationality, or social origin. Elimination of discrimination is also 
specifically mentioned in voluntary codes for multinational companies, such as the 
4 ILO’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy or the United Nations’ Global Compact project (see Lozano and Boni, 
2002). 
Forced labor had been the subject of one of the earliest ILO conventions, namely 
the Forced Labor Convention (No. 29) from 1930. Its Article 2.1 defines ‘forced or 
compulsory labor’ as ‘all work or service, which is exacted from any person under the 
menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself 
voluntarily’. The convention calls for the elimination of forced labor, allowing only 
few exceptions, such as military service, service in times of emergency and minor 
communal services. The Abolition of Forced Labor Convention (No. 105) from 1957 
supplements the older convention and is more concerned with the use of forced labor 
for political objectives and for purposes of suppressing demands from labor groups. 
The issue of forced labor received great public attention in the late 1990s when the 
ILO established a Commission of Inquiry into Myanmar’s alleged use of forced labor 
following complaints from workers. In November 2000, the ILO took the extra-
ordinary step of asking its member countries, employers and workers’ organizations 
to re-examine and sever relationships with Myanmar due to the country’s ‘continued, 
widespread, systematic, egregious use of forced labor’ (Bellace, 2001: 277). In 2003, 
negotiations led to a Joint Plan of Action between the government of Myanmar and 
the ILO. This plan could not be implemented until early 2005, however, as ILO 
(2005: 26) laments. 
Existing studies on the effect of globalization on gender-related aspects of 
employment have either focused on the female employment share in the labor force or 
the wage gap between men and women (see next section). These are not ideal 
measures of economic discrimination against women. As we will argue below, an 
5 increased share of female employment following trade liberalization need not be 
caused by a decrease in discrimination, need not be entirely beneficial to women, and 
liberalized trade is likely to increase female employment in some countries and reduce 
it in others. The so-called gender wage gap is a better and more direct measure of 
discrimination against women if one can hold other factors constant that might be 
responsible for the gap, such as level of education and skill endowments. But there are 
many forms of discrimination other than unequal pay for work of equal value. Our 
original contribution is to look at a measure of women’s economic rights that includes 
the pay gap, but also covers other important aspects of gender discrimination, such as 
the right to work in specific circumstances, discrimination in hiring and promotion 
practices, freedom of choice of profession etc. (see the description of research design 
below for details). This is not only a measure that has hitherto not been employed in 
existing studies, but it is also arguably a better, more comprehensive measure of the 
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation against 
women, as required by ILO Conventions 100 and 111. As concerns our second major 
focus in this paper, we know of no previous study that has addressed the question of 
globalization’s effects on forced and compulsory labor in a rigorous way. 
In short, our findings show that countries that are more open to trade have better 
economic rights for women and have a lower incidence of forced labor. This holds 
true in a global and in a sub-sample of developing countries.
1 The result is robust 
toward controlling for potential reverse causality with the help of instrumental 
variable regression. Our results tentatively suggest that as countries open more toward 
global markets and trade more relative to their gross domestic product, respect for 
                                                 
1 We define developing countries as all countries other than Canada and the United States, Western 
Europe, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. 
6 these two aspects of core, or fundamental labor rights improve. However, a higher 
penetration of the economy with foreign investment measured as the ratio of 
accumulated stocks of FDI to GDP does not seem to have any impact. 
This article is structured as follows: In the next section, we discuss the various 
impacts that globalization can have on women’s economic rights and the incidence of 
forced labor. It will become apparent that there are highly plausible arguments for 
both beneficial and detrimental effects. Which prevails is therefore largely an 
empirical question. A description of the research design is followed by a presentation 
of results, the implications of which are discussed in the concluding section. 
 
Globalization, discrimination and forced labor 
Traditional Hecksher-Ohlin type trade theory predicts that trade liberalization will 
increase female employment in developing countries. Countries will expand the 
production of goods that are intensive in factors, which are abundantly available. In 
developing countries this is a large supply of relatively unskilled laborers. Partly 
because of prior discrimination in education and due to social and cultural restrictions 
on female employment opportunities, women represent the bulk of unskilled 
labourers. As developing countries expand their production of goods that can be 
manufactured without highly developed skills and without much training in such 
sectors as electronics assembly, textiles, apparel, tanning and leather goods, women’s 
participation in the work force is likely to increase. Globalization is certainly not the 
only factor behind the sharp rise in female employment in developing countries over 
the last several decades, but most studies agree that the increased integration of 
7 developing countries into the world economy has been an important factor (Fontana, 
Joekes and Masika, 1998; Tzannatos, 1999).
2 
These effects of globalization on women’s economic activity have not been 
entirely beneficial, however. First, trade theory predicts as well that developed 
countries will see a contraction of production in corresponding economic sectors, 
which likely affect women most due to the high share of female employment in these 
sectors. This is indeed what most empirical studies find, with the exception of Wood 
(1991) – see Kucera and Milberg (2000). The gains in female employment in 
developing countries might have come to some extent at the expense of female 
employment losses in developed countries. Second, in developing country economies 
that are predominantly agrarian, globalization has often meant a shift toward cash 
crop production for exports together with increased competition for food crops, a shift 
that adversely affects women that are predominantly employed in small non-export 
oriented farms (Çağatay and Ertürk, 2004: 21). Also, a high rate of female 
participation in agriculture and household work need not go hand in hand with 
autonomy to choose professions (Morrisson and Jütting, 2005). Third, without a more 
equal sharing of unpaid domestic work, women’s overall work burden is likely to 
increase as they take up paid employment (Fontana and Wood, 2000). Fourth, some 
argue that the female employment expansion was only possible because women took 
up low-paid, insecure, casual jobs with poor working conditions (Standing, 1999; 
Çağatay and Ertürk, 2004). Thus, more employment of women as a share of total 
                                                 
2 Tzannatos (1999, p. 553) reports that the average developing country female participation rate rose 
from 35.9 per cent in early censuses from the 1950s and 1960s to 47.9 per cent in censuses of the 1980s 
and 1990s. 
8 labor may not mean women’s status improved in any meaningful way, relative to 
men. 
In as much as women’s wages are lower than that of men for work of equal value, 
this effect will show up in the gender wage gap, to which we turn now.
3 For similar 
reasons as for the increase in the female employment share, traditional Stolper-
Samuelson type trade theory would predict that women’s wages would tend to go up 
in developing countries and decrease in developed countries. Modernization theorists 
(often instructed by neo-liberal economic theories) similarly see greater contact 
between the rich and poor as beneficial for the poor since forces of modernization 
lead to the breakdown of traditional values and practices such as patriarchy and 
discrimination of women, leading to greater emancipation (Lerner, 1958; Inglehart, 
1988). Since cultural values may hinder the emancipation of women, the education of 
girls, and affect fertility rates in particular, some societies are likely to remain trapped 
in a vicious cycle of poverty, which in turn induces further marginalization because 
these values hinder the globalization of these economies (Harrison and Huntington, 
2000). Thus, modernization requires globalization and vice versa, which certain 
cultural traits in some societies may prevent, working particularly through the 
disempowering effects of culture on women’s role in society (Donno and Russett, 
2004). 
Critics argue, however, that far from being an emancipatory force, globalization 
and economic discrimination of women go hand in hand. Dependency and world-
systems theorists regard the contact between rich and poor as exploitative, reinforcing 
                                                 
3 However, some argue that the expansion of female employment has had spill-over effects and has led 
to a more general ‘feminization’ of jobs and labour conditions with adverse effects on both men and 
women (Çağatay and Ertürk, 2004). 
9 dependent patterns of development, both between countries and within. These 
theorists blame greater trade integration and the activities of MNCs that spread 
capitalist modes of production in ‘peripheral countries’ as a source of intensified 
exploitation of women. Women are subjected to greater subordination, increasing 
their overall burden with little rewards (Griffin and Gurley, 1985; Mies et al, 1988; 
Momsen, 1991). Ward (1984: 3), for example, maintains that ‘the intrusion of the 
world-system through foreign investment from and trade dependency on core nations 
has operated to reduce women’s status relative to men’s’, the reason being that ‘men 
and the TNCs [Trans-national corporations] often define women’s proper roles as 
reproducers and unpaid subsistence laborers within the domestic sphere’ (for a similar 
argument, see Chafetz (1984: 66)). Critics also argue that increased competition due 
to globalization will diminish the bargaining power of wage labourers. In a desperate 
attempt to remain competitive in the face of cut-throat competition from many other 
locations in the global market place, wages need to be kept down, or so the argument 
goes. This could affect women more if they work mainly in sectors that are heavily 
affected by foreign competition (Berik, Rodgers and Zveglich, 2004). However, while 
these effects can change the relative wages paid to women and thereby affect the 
general gender wage gap, it does not mean that the discrimination-based gender wage 
gap is affected, as the latter refers to the differential wages that are paid to women 
relative to men for work of equal value. For example, Artecona and Cunningham 
(2002) show that the gender wage gap increased in the Mexican manufacturing sector 
during the trade liberalization period 1987 to 1993, but once skill differentials and 
general economic changes were taken into account, trade liberalization actually 
reduced the discrimination-based gender wage gap, even though the effect is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels of significance.  
10 Following the path-breaking work of Becker (1957), economists argue that a 
discrimination-based gender wage gap can exist if (predominantly male) employers 
have a taste for discrimination. However, since employers either fail to pay female 
employees their full marginal product or pay men more than their marginal product, 
satisfying their taste for discrimination will incur some economic cost on them. 
Becker argues that it becomes more difficult to indulge in tastes for discrimination as 
competition increases, which punishes all forms of wasteful economic behaviour 
(capitalists like higher profits). In as much as trade liberalization and the entrance of 
foreign investors steps up the competitive pressure on firms, one would expect to see 
a decrease in gender discrimination (as in all other forms of discrimination). 
Importantly, this should be the case in both developed and developing countries, even 
though it is expected to be stronger in countries (and within sectors) where 
globalization has led to sharper increases in competition.  
Empirical evidence supports the view that discrimination is more widespread the 
less competition there is (Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske, 2002). Black and 
Brainerd (2004) find that increased competition through trade liberalization has closed 
the gender-gap in wages in the U.S. by reducing firm’s ability to discriminate against 
women.
4 Artecona and Cunningham (2002) find the same for Mexico, but the effect is 
not statistically significant at conventional levels, as already noted above. Fontana and 
Wood (2000) come to the conclusion that an increase in foreign investment and an 
increase in manufactured exports is likely to narrow the gender wage gap according to 
their computable general equilibrium model of Bangladesh. Berik, Rodgers and 
                                                 
4 The Japanese example is a good instance of where women prefer to work for foreign companies 
because of barriers in domestic firms for advancement and betterment (see Bhagwati, 2004 for 
discussion). 
11 Zveglich (2004), on the other hand, find that increased competition from foreign trade 
in concentrated industries in South Korea and Taiwan is increasing the gender wage 
gap, thus contradicting Becker’s theory. None of these country case studies can 
capture general trends, however. Oostendorp (2004) looks at the effect of FDI inflows 
and trade on the gender wage gap in more than 80 countries, disaggregated by 161 
occupations. The results suggest that both FDI and trade decrease the gender wage 
gap in both rich and poor countries for low-skill, but not for high-skill occupations. 
The gender gap in high-skill occupations in poor countries might even increase with 
higher FDI inflows. 
Compulsory or forced labor comes in many forms, classified by ILO (2001) into 
eight categories: slavery and abduction, compulsory participation in public works, 
coercive recruitment practices in agriculture and remote rural areas, bonded domestic 
work, debt bondage, exaction of forced labor by the military, trafficking for sexual 
and economic exploitation and, lastly, prison labor. This form of labor exaction can 
thus be imposed by either a state or by private economic agents for commercial gain. 
ILO (2005) estimates that there are between 9.8 to 14.8 million forced laborers 
worldwide that fall into one of these categories. To our knowledge, no study has ever 
rigorously and quantitatively addressed the impact of globalization on the incidence 
of forced labor and there is even little conceptual or theoretical treatment of this 
odious fact. However, forced labor can be interpreted as an extreme form of wage 
discrimination: instead of receiving their marginal product, workers subject to forced 
or compulsory forms of labor receive only minimal wages, if anything at all. A greater 
degree of competition from higher integration into globalized markets should 
therefore reduce the incidence of forced labor similar to the reduction in economic 
discrimination against women. 
12 Yet, at the same time, the logic that critics of globalization apply in terms of the 
detrimental effects of the pressure to cut costs might also lead to an increase in forced 
labor. As a report by ILO (2005: 63) has put it: ‘It is now clearer that competitive 
pressures can have an adverse impact on conditions of employment and, at their 
extreme, can lead to forced labor. With global pressures on suppliers to reduce costs 
by every available means, retailers and intermediaries can take advantage of the 
intense competition between suppliers in order to squeeze profits out of them.’ 
Similarly, Bales (1999: 9f.) argues that forced labor can constitute a ‘significant part’ 
of a cost-saving strategy of multinational companies. In addition, he suggests that 
modernization and globalization of the world economy have destroyed family and 
small-scale subsistence farming, with the consequence that sometimes farmers ended 
up in forced agricultural labor. The question of whether globalization has a beneficial 
or detrimental impact on this aspect of core labor rights is therefore foremost an 
empirical question, as it is the case with economic discrimination of women. 
Beside these more direct effects, globalization might also have an indirect impact 
on both discrimination and forced labor via institutional and norm convergence. Sachs 
and Warner (1995) argue that globalization is about more than just market integration 
and that it induces integrated countries to harmonize institutional and other regulatory 
arrangements. Given that developed countries dominate the international economic 
system and on average grant women better economic rights and have a lower 
incidence of forced labor, one can expect that their higher standards provide the role 
model to which countries with lower standards are moving towards. Such policy 
contagion dynamics working via communication, learning, imitation and altered 
reputation payoffs are well established in the literature on the diffusion of economic 
policies in globalize markets (Simmons and Elkins, 2004). With respect to reputation 
13 effects, for example, export oriented countries with production dominated by foreign 
investors might find it more difficult to treat women badly or employ forced labor as 
they are under higher scrutiny by the media, consumers, human rights and other 
activist non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Since the consumers of the goods 
produced by foreign investors in many developing countries are located in richer 
countries, companies are increasingly sensitive to how people perceive their brand 
name (Fung, O’Rourke, and Sabel, 2001). Bernstein (2001) reports that producers in 
these countries are starting to subscribe to voluntary codes of conduct of good 
practice with respect to labor standards. 
It is of course possible that economic discrimination against women and the 
existence of forced labor have feedback effects on a country’s position in a 
globalizing world. Foreign investors could be attracted by forced labor or by very low 
female wages and poor occupational conditions. The same conditions might give 
certain, mainly developing, countries an additional comparative advantage, 
particularly in the export of labor-intensive goods. In fact, critics claim that 
globalization favors capitalist classes over labor unions. Busse and Spiegelmann 
(2005) report evidence that a higher gender wage gap promotes the export of labor-
intensive goods, whereas the opposite is the case for gender inequality in labor force 
activity and educational attainment rates. In a country study of South Korea, Seguino 
(1997) finds that the gender wage gap can explain some of the country’s growth in 
exports. As concerns FDI, both Kucera (2002) and Busse and Spielmann (2003) find 
no evidence that greater gender inequality attracts foreign investors. Similarly, Busse 
and Braun (2003) find no evidence that a higher incidence of forced labor attracts FDI 
flows, but report that forced labor gives developing countries an additional advantage 
in the export of labor-intensive goods. While not totally conclusive, these studies 
14 suggest the need to control for potential feedback effects. In addition, some studies 
suggest that gender inequality – which is not identical to economic discrimination 
against women, but correlated with it – has detrimental effects on economic 
development (Dollar and Gatti, 1999; Klasen, 1999) while others find the opposite 
(Seguino, 2000), which means that the level of per capita income might be 
endogenous as well. In our estimations, we will tackle this problem with the help of 




Our measure of women’s economic rights is taken from Cingranelli and Richards’ 
(2004) Human Rights Database. The measure covers the following rights: 
 
•  Equal pay for equal work 
•  Free choice of profession or employment without the need to obtain a husband or 
male relative's consent 
•   The right to gainful employment without the need to obtain a husband or male 
relative's consent 
•  Equality in hiring and promotion practices 
•  Job security (maternity leave, unemployment benefits, no arbitrary firing or 
layoffs, etc...) 
•  Non-discrimination by employers 
•  The right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace 
•  The right to work at night 
•  The right to work in occupations classified as dangerous 
15 •  The right to work in the military and the police force 
 
Using the annual United States State Department’s Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices, Cingranelli and Richards code a discrete variable that takes on one 
of four values based on the following coding scheme (see Cingranelli and Richards 
(2004) for a detailed description of decision rules for coding this variable): 
 
(0) There are no economic rights for women under law and systematic discrimination 
based on sex may be built into the law. The government tolerates a high level of 
discrimination against women. 
(1) There are some economic rights for women under law. However, in practice, the 
government DOES NOT enforce the laws effectively or enforcement of laws is weak. 
The government tolerates a moderate level of discrimination against women. 
(2) There are some economic rights for women under law. In practice, the government 
DOES enforce these laws effectively. However, the government still tolerates a low 
level of discrimination against women. 
(3) All or nearly all of women's economic rights are guaranteed by law. In practice, 
the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws. The government tolerates 
none or almost no discrimination against women. 
 
For forced labor, we have two independent sources. We use both to establish some 
robustness in the results we obtain. One is taken from Kucera (2001) and is based on 
various ILO publications and the US State Department’s Country Reports on Human 
Rights. Kucera codes a variable that indicates the existence of forced labor in four 
economic sectors, namely manufacturing, mining, construction and market-oriented 
16 agriculture, forestry or fishing, so that the variable runs from 0 (no evidence in any 
sector) to 4 (evidence of forced labor in all four sectors). To qualify, there must be 
evidence of forced labor in one or the other form of: 
 
1. Chattel slavery on behalf of private agents 
2. Bonded labour or serfdom on behalf of private agents 
3. Other or not specified on behalf of private agents 
4. In private prisons or state-run prisons on behalf of private agents 
5. In state-run prisons other or not specified 
6. Resulting from state policy other than prison labour and “grey areas” 
 
The second measure of forced labor is taken from Busse and Braun (2003). Using 
information from the US State Department reports as well as ILO (2001), Avery 
(2002) and Anti-Slavery International and ICFTU (2001), they look for evidence for 
one of eight forms of forced labor identified by ILO (2001), namely slavery and 
abduction, compulsory participation in public works, coercive recruitment practices in 
agriculture and remote rural areas, bonded domestic work, debt bondage, exaction of 
forced labor by the military, trafficking for sexual and economic exploitation and, 
lastly, prison labor. Dummy variables for evidence of the existence of each form of 
forced labor are created. These are then summed up with equal weight to give an 
overall measure of forced labor. There are two exceptions to this rule. First, for 
trafficking in persons, Busse and Braun (2003) hold that there is enough information 
in the sources to allow an intermediate coding of 0.5 in addition to 0 and 1. Second, 
the bonded labor dummy is counted twice in the summation. Busse and Braun (2003: 
7) justify this rule by saying that ‘since bonded labor is the most common form of 
17 forced labor, a country that has problems with bonded labor is more likely to use 
forced labor on a large scale than, for instance, a country in which coercive 
recruitment systems exist’. The aggregate measure of forced labor therefore runs on a 
scale from 0 (no evidence for forced labor in any form) to 9 (evidence for forced labor 
in all eight forms with bonded labor counted twice). The two measures of forced labor 
are correlated at r = 0.45. This is clearly statistically significant, but perhaps below 
what one might expect. The less-than-perfect correlation has to do with different 
coding rules, different sources used etc. Thus, if we do find similar results using both 
measures, it will allow us to be somewhat more confident of the robustness of results. 
 
Explanatory variables 
Our indicator of the extent of trade openness is the ratio of the sum of exports and 
imports to GDP (TRADE/GDP). As our measure of penetration by foreign direct 
investment we use the accumulated stock of FDI relative to GDP as this measure 
reflects the lasting impact of such investment accumulated over time rather than the 
more volatile short-term inward investment flows (FDISTOCK/GDP). Accumulated 
stock to GDP, rather than flow, also reflects the power of the MNCs over domestic 
actors for shaping the political agendas of governments because it measures the 
relative influence of foreign over domestic economic actors (De Soysa and Oneal, 
1999). 
Logged per capita income (lnGDPPC) is included since more economically 
developed countries are likely to have lower economic discrimination against women 
and a lower incidence of forced labor under the reasonable assumption that these 
rights are what economists call normal goods, i.e. goods for which demand increases 
with rising income (data taken from Heston, Summers and Aten, 2002). 
18 Modernization theory similarly argues that the increase in economic opportunities 
brought about by higher economic development will make it more difficult for 
employers to discriminate against women (Forsythe, Korzeniewicz and Durrant, 
2000). Boserup (1970) suggests that the relationship might be non-linear with 
economic development first providing men with preferential access to economic 
resources, only benefiting women after a threshold level of economic development 
has been reached and women start entering the paid workforce. Some feminists even 
suggest that economic development might increase economic discrimination against 
women (Charlton, 1997). In pre-tests we included a squared income term to account 
for Boserup’s hypothesis of non-linear relationship, but did not find it to be 
statistically significant. For this reason, income enters the estimations reported below 
only linearly. 
To test whether ratification of the relevant ILO conventions has an impact, we 
include dummy variables of whether a country had ratified the ILO Conventions 100 
and 111 (CONVRAT100 and CONVRAT111) for economic discrimination against 
women as the dependent variable. Similarly, we include dummies for ratification by 
1994 of ILO Conventions 29 and 105 for forced labor as the dependent variable 
(CONVRAT29 and CONVRAT105). This information is provided by the ILO’s 
Database of International Labor Standards (www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/). Whether 
ratification of these conventions has any effect on the actual behavior of ratifying 
countries is highly contested, however. From a realist international relations 
perspective, ratification of a convention on paper does not mean anything in actual 
practice unless there are stringent compliance and enforcement mechanisms in place 
and powerful countries take an interest in enforcing the rules. Countries with poor 
rights might even be more likely to ratify under these circumstances in the hope that 
19 ratification will deflect criticism without any actual change in the human rights 
position (Neumayer, 2006). The lack of a strong enforcement and sanctioning 
mechanism for breach of ILO conventions and the resulting reliance on voluntary 
compliance is widely noted (Block et al., 2001). 
In a fully democratic society, the preferences of the median voter should 
determine political outcomes. Since women represent a slight majority in most 
country’s electorate, one would expect that in fully democratic countries women 
enjoy no worse economic rights than men. Of course, this depends on a fully 
competitive political system and the majority of policy makers are male in most 
countries, including democracies. However, one would still expect that democracies 
grant higher economic rights to women relative to authoritarian regimes. As concerns 
forced labor, since such labor violates human rights and democracies are often 
regarded as being more protective of human rights (Poe, Tate, and Keith, 1999), one 
would expect that democracies have a lower incidence of forced labor. Data on 
political rights from Freedom House (2004) are taken as our measure of 
DEMOCRACY.
5 This index is based on expert judgment on the freeness and 
competitiveness of the electoral process, political participation and political pluralism. 
Political economy arguments further suggest partisan effects. Left-wing governments 
traditionally embrace full economic rights for women as part of their political agenda, 
whereas conservative parties in many countries hold on to a traditional role model of 
men as the main breadwinner. Even in Communist countries, where we observe 
                                                 
5 Note that our democracy measure relies on the political rights measure from Freedom House only, as 
the complementary civil liberties measure includes equality of opportunity and the absence of 
economic exploitation as part of the criteria used to construct the measure. The original score on 
Freedom House’s measure has been reversed such that higher values mean more political rights. 
20 massive violations of other forms of fundamental labor rights such as the freedom of 
association and collective bargaining, women are typically not much discriminated 
against in economic life. There is less reason to expect a partisan effect on the 
existence of forced labor. No political party embraces forced labor as part of their 
political agenda. As information for the political orientation of the ruling government, 
we use a dummy variable from the World Bank’s (2002) Database of Political 
Institutions indicating whether the chief executive’s party was of left-wing political 
orientation (mainly communist, socialist and social democratic parties). 
For women’s economic rights only, we entered an additional variable capturing 
the percentage share of Muslims among the population (%MUSLIM), with data taken 
from La Porta et al. (1999). This is to account for the fact that in many Muslim 
societies women are not regarded as equal to men in professional life. Morrisson and 
Jütting (2005) show that there are important regional differences with respect to social 
institutions reflecting long-standing norms, customs and traditions such as genital 
mutilation and dress codes, marriage, parenting, inheritance, ownership and 
movement rights. To account for these differences, we include regional dummy 
variables following World Bank (2003) classification for Western Europe, Sub-
Saharan Africa, Northern Africa and the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, and Northern America in order to capture 
some crude cultural, historical and other differences. North Africa and the Middle 
East represent the omitted reference category in the estimations. For forced labor as 
the dependent variable, we do not include regional dummy variables for two reasons: 
First, some regions like Northern America do not have any incidence of forced labor 
according to our two measures, which creates problems for the maximum-likelihood 
estimator employed. Second, the regional dummy variables make instrumental 
21 variable regression estimation in a pure cross-sectional sample extremely inefficient. 
For these reasons, we include a dummy for OECD countries instead to account for the 
difference in forced labor between developed and developing countries not captured 
by our explanatory variables. Tables 1 and 2 provide summary descriptive variable 
information and a bivariate correlation matrix of the dependent variables and the main 
explanatory variables. Variance inflation analysis did not suggest reason for concern 
with multicollinearity problems. 
Women’s economic rights are measured over a period of time and explanatory 
variables are therefore annual contemporaneous observations. For forced labor as the 
dependent variable, which is only available cross-sectionally, the explanatory 
variables are averages over the years 1990 to 1994. The average is taken to reduce the 
impact of single years and increase sample size and the end year is 1994 since the 
dependent variable derived from Kucera (2001) captures the incidence of forced labor 
from around the mid-1990s.
6 
 
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
 
Estimation technique 
We estimate the model with women’s economic rights as the dependent variable with 
ordered logit analysis to account for the fact that the variable is not cardinal, but 
ordinal. The count data nature of the forced labor dependent variable provided by 
Kucera (2001) suggests usage of an estimation technique that is particularly suitable 
                                                 
6 The Busse and Braun (2002) measure refers to 1999, but we keep the explanatory variables the same 
for both measures. This should not be a problem due to the very high over-time persistence in the 
incidence of forced labor. 
22 for count data such as the negative binomial regression. The one provided by Busse 
and Braun (2003) is not strictly speaking a count measure (due to the weighting of 
two of its sub-components), but it is very close to it, so we also use the negative 
binomial. For all estimations we use robust standard errors. For the women’s 
economic rights measure, which varies over time as well, we additionally allow 
observations to be clustered on countries. That is, observations are assumed to be 
independent only across countries, but not necessarily within countries over time. 
As discussed above, it is possible that trade openness and the extent of a country’s 
penetration by FDI as well as per capita income are endogenous to women’s 
economic rights and the existence of forced labor. For this reason, we also use 
instrumental variable (IV) regression where we instrument for trade, FDI and per 
capita income. For women’s economic rights as the dependent variable, this is a 
random-effects IV estimator to account for the cross-sectional time-series nature of 
the data (there is, unfortunately, too little over-time variation in the dependent 
variable to allow fixed-effects IV estimation). Note that the IV regressions are based 
on a two-stage least squares estimator since there is no easy-to-use routine for IV 
estimation with either ordered logit or negative binominal regression in STATA, the 
statistical package used. For instruments to be valid they must be known not to affect 
women’s rights or the existence of forced labor directly other than through the 
instrumented variables or be affected by it and known to affect trade openness and 
FDI, but not be affected by it. Valid instruments are typically hard to come by. In our 
choice we were inspired by the so-called gravity model of international trade, by the 
literature on the determinants of FDI location and by geographical explanations of 
variation in per capita income. The literature on the determinants of FDI is much less 
specific and consistent, however, than the gravity model is for the determinants of 
23 trade openness or the geographical explanations for variation in per capita income. As 
instruments we use population size, size of land area, a country’s minimum distance 
to either New York, Rotterdam or Tokyo, all in natural logs, a dummy variable, which 
is set to one if a country shares a common language with one of the countries of the 
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, a dummy variable for 
countries that are landlocked, and the sum of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 
signed by a country. We see little reason why the demographic and spatial instruments 
should affect labor rights other than through the instrumented variables, and they are 
clearly not affected by these rights, nor by the instrumented variables. At the same 
time, they affect per capita income, trade openness and, if less so, FDI. In other 
words, they are good candidates for IV regression. Slightly problematic is the total 
number of BITs signed, which is included since countries with a higher number of 
BITs can be expected to attract more FDI (Neumayer and Spess, 2005). Exogeneity is 
contestable in this case, but sensitivity analysis demonstrated that the main results are 
not affected much if this variable is dropped from the set of instruments. Data for the 




We start with women’s economic rights, for which table 3 provides ordered logit 
estimation results. Results for the full sample are presented in column I without the 
regional dummy variables, then in column II with these variables included. Column I 
suggests that countries that are more open to trade provide better economic rights to 
women. The stock of FDI does not matter, however. The control variables test in line 
with expectations: Women’s economic rights are better in more developed and 
24 democratic countries as well as countries in which the chief executive belongs to a 
left-wing party, whereas rights are lower in countries with a higher share of Muslims. 
Ratification of the two relevant ILO conventions does not matter. Adding the regional 
dummy variables in column II does not change results much. The main difference is 
that ratification of ILO convention 111 (but not 100) is now associated with better 
rights. Of course, it is not clear whether ratification leads to better rights in its wake or 
whether countries with better rights are more likely to ratify.
7 Contingent on the 
explanatory variables, women enjoy better economic rights in Western Europe and 
Northern America and worse rights in South Asia than in Northern Africa and the 
Middle East, the omitted reference category. Repeating the two estimations, but 
restricting the sample to developing countries only in columns III and IV shows that 
the results are not much affected and are therefore not driven by the presence of 
developed countries in the sample.  
 
< Insert Table 3 about here > 
 
In table 4, the set of estimations from table 3 is repeated, but employing 
instrumental variable regression analysis. Not surprisingly, this lowers the efficiency 
of estimation. Yet, as before, countries more open to trade and countries with a left-
wing oriented chief executive have higher women’s economic rights, whereas the 
opposite is the case for countries with a higher share of Muslim population. The 
instrumental variable regression estimation in the developing country only sample 
with regional dummy variables included is so inefficient as to render all variables 
                                                 
7 Ideally, one would want to use instruments for ratification of both conventions as well. However, we 
were unable to find good instruments. We leave this for future research. 
25 statistically insignificant. A higher per capita income is associated with better 
economic rights for women, but only in column I. 
 
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
 
In table 5, we turn to the incidence of forced labor. Negative binomial regression 
results for the measure taken from Kucera (2001) are presented first for the full 
sample and then for a developing country sample only (columns I and II). Countries 
that are more open to trade have a lower incidence of forced labor. The opposite is the 
case for more democratic countries. This result might be surprising, but it does not 
uphold for the alternative measure of forced labor (see below). Ratification of ILO 
Convention 29 is positively correlated with forced labor, but only in column I, 
whereas ratification of ILO Convention 105 is negatively correlated with forced labor, 
but only in column II. There is thus no consistent effect. None of the other variables 
are statistically significant. In columns III and IV the measure taken from Busse and 
Braun (2003) is taken as the dependent variable. Trade openness remains a predictor 
of lower forced labor incidence in both samples. OECD countries have a lower forced 
labor incidence, but the type of political regime no longer matters. Neither do any of 
the other explanatory variables. 
 
< Insert Table 5 about here > 
 
Repeating the set of estimations from table 5 with the instrumental variable 
regression technique leads to the results presented in table 6. Trade openness remains 
statistically significant with a negative coefficient sign throughout. The main 
26 differences are that ratification of ILO Convention 29 is now consistently associated 
with higher forced labor incidence. Contingent on OECD countries having a lower 
forced labor incidence, per capita income is associated with higher and democracy 
with lower incidence in column III, but both variables become statistically 
insignificant in the developing country only sample. The reported over-identification 
test fails to reject the assumption of exogenous instruments at the 5 per cent level for 
columns I to III, but not for column IV. 
 
< Insert Table 6 about here > 
 
In further sensitivity analysis, we replaced the measures of forced labor with a 
simple dummy variable that was set to one if there was any evidence for forced labor. 
The reason is that just because forced labor exists in more economic sectors in 
country A than in country B does not necessarily imply that the extent of the problem 
is any worse in country A than in country B. For example, according to the measure 
provided by Kucera (2001), there is evidence for forced labor in all four sectors in 
Brazil, Pakistan and India, whereas there is evidence for forced labor for only one 
sector in Myanmar despite the ILO finding of widespread use of forced labor in this 
country, as mentioned in the introductory section. Using logit to account for the 
dichotomous nature of the alternative dependent variables, results are very consistent 
with the ones using the original count measures of forced labor, implying that the 
results are not just tainted by the number of sectors in a country. 
 
27 Conclusion 
Does globalization increase the economic discrimination women face in many 
countries over the world? Does it increase the incidence of forced labor? Given our 
research design, we can only offer tentative answers since we can only control for 
regional, not country fixed effects, in the regressions on women’s rights and the 
sample is purely cross-sectional in the regressions on forced labor. If anything, 
however, our analysis suggests that women in countries that are more open to trade 
enjoy better economic rights and there is less incidence of forced labor in countries 
more integrated into global markets than in countries that are more closed. This effect 
is robust toward excluding developed countries from the sample and upholds in 
instrumental variable regression analysis, except that trade openness is not statistically 
significant for women’s economic rights when regional dummy variables are added to 
instrumental variable regression. It also holds for two independent measures of forced 
labor incidence. 
Contrary to trade openness, we find no evidence that the extent of an economy’s 
penetration with FDI, the second major component of globalization, has an effect on 
any of the dependent variables. There may be several explanations for this. One 
plausible reason is that the FDI stock to GDP measure for resource-rich poor 
countries are quite high, but these countries may suffer from aspects of the resource 
curse where government’s make little investment in the modernization of the 
economy. Thus, the type of FDI may matter. Unfortunately, there is no 
comprehensive data available on dis-aggregated types of FDI. Further, the source of 
FDI may also matter. Future work might examine whether there exist differences in 
FDI coming from Western democratic countries as opposed to FDI from other 
28 countries, mainly from East and South-East Asia. Unfortunately, this would lead to a 
much smaller sample due to lack of data. 
Globalization is not only driven by trade openness and FDI. Other features of 
globalization – for example, easier and cheaper travel and communication 
possibilities – can increase the incidence of forced labor in the form of sexual and 
other trafficking of people to developed countries, an aspect that ILO (2001) has 
termed the ‘underside of globalization’. Clearly, these negative aspects are outside the 
scope of the present paper’s analysis. 
This third and final paper concludes our analysis of the effects of globalization on 
core or fundamental labor rights (see Neumayer and de Soysa (2005, 2006) for 
existing publications). Throughout we found evidence suggesting that trade openness 
promotes these rights, whereas a higher penetration with FDI only had a beneficial 
effect on the incidence of child labor. It is entirely possible of course, perhaps even 
likely, that globalization boosts the bargaining power of capital at the expense of 
labor, which would put downward pressure on outcome-related labor standards such 
as wages, working times and other employment conditions. These have not been the 
subjects of our analyses. When it comes to core or fundamental labor rights, however, 
globalization seems to have beneficial rather than harmful effects. 
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36 Table 1. Descriptive variable information and correlation matrix for women’s 
economic rights estimations. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std.  Dev. Min Max 
WOMEN’S ECONOMIC RIGHTS  2234 1.35  0.63  0  3 
TRADE/GDP 2234 68.73 37.53  6.32 282.40
FDISTOCK/GDP 2234 16.17 19.39  0  271.57
ln GDPPC  2234 8.33  1.10  6.05 10.69
DEMOCRACY 2234 4.57  2.13  1  7 
GOVLEFT 2234 0.31  0.46  0  1 
%MUSLIM 2234 19.88 32.77  0  99.50
CONV100RAT 2234 0.78  0.42  0  1 
CONV111RAT 2234 0.75  0.43  0  1 
 
 
  I  II III IV V VI  VII  VIII 
I:  WOMEN’S  ECONOMIC  RIGHTS         
II:  TRADE/GDP  0.18        
III:  FDISTOCK/GDP  0.05 0.45       
IV:  ln  GDPPC  0.55 0.20 0.06      
V:  DEMOCRACY  0.49 0.15 0.07 0.70     
VI: GOVLEFT  0.11 -0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.07      
VII: %MUSLIM  -0.33 -0.05 -0.02 -0.34 0.45 -0.07    
VIII: CONV100RAT  0.16 -0.12 -0.06 0.16 -0.10 0.04 -0.02   
IX: CONV111RAT  0.09 -0.21 -0.11 0.03 -0.05 0.11 0.15  0.64 
 
37 Table 2. Descriptive variable information and correlation matrix for forced labor 
estimations: 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
FORCED LABOR (Kucera)  135 0.33  0.78  0  4 
FORCED LABOR (Busse & Braun)  128 0.54  0.79  0  3.50 
TRADE/GDP 135 73.29 44.61  16.28 359.76
FDISTOCK/GDP 135 14.39 15.77  0.20 90.92
ln GDPPC   135 8.31  1.09  6.11 10.29
DEMOCRACY 135 4.60  1.97  1  7 
GOVLEFT 135 0.29  0.38  0  1 
CONV29RAT 135 0.79  0.39  0  1 
CONV105RAT 135 0.67  0.47  0  1 
 
 I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII 
I:  FORCED  LABOR  (Kucera)          
II: FORCED LABOR (Busse & Braun)  0.45              
III:  TRADE/GDP  -0.23 -0.25       
IV:  FDISTOCK/GDP  -0.15 -0.21 0.55      
V: ln GDPPC   -0.19 -0.38 0.24 0.10        
VI: DEMOCRACY  -0.06 -0.32 0.11 0.06 0.70      
VII: GOVLEFT  0.08 0.06 -0.04 0.05 -0.13 0.02    
VIII: CONV29RAT  0.08 0.03 0.04 0.15 0.06 0.02 -0.01   
IX: CONV105RAT  -0.06 -0.15 -0.13 0.09 0.17 0.24 -0.04  0.37 
 
38 Table 3. Ordered logit results for women’s economic rights. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
TRADE/GDP 0.010  0.009  0.012  0.010 
 (2.94)***  (2.85)***  (2.94)***  (2.48)** 
FDISTOCK/GDP -0.002  -0.002  -0.004  -0.004 
 (0.26)  (0.17)  (0.35)  (0.34) 
ln GDPPC  0.947  0.464  0.522  0.345 
 (5.02)***  (2.37)**  (2.48)**  (1.63)* 
DEMOCRACY 0.162  0.176  0.127  0.167 
 (2.10)**  (2.26)**  (1.69)*  (2.15)** 
GOVLEFT 0.585  0.566  0.544  0.610 
 (2.62)***  (2.65)***  (2.23)**  (2.47)** 
%MUSLIM -0.013  -0.014  -0.013  -0.010 
 (2.33)**  (2.33)**  (2.28)**  (1.81)* 
CONV100RAT 0.394  0.075  0.268  0.006 
 (0.99)  (0.21)  (0.57)  (0.02) 
CONV111RAT 0.435  0.779  0.497  0.797 
 (1.18)  (2.31)**  (1.10)  (1.92)* 
East Asia & Pacific    0.310    0.802 
   (0.47)    (1.03) 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia    -0.011    0.625 
   (0.02)    (0.84) 
Sub-Saharan Africa    -0.412    -0.025 
   (0.62)    (0.04) 
South Asia    -1.726    -1.409 
   (2.34)**    (1.72)* 
Latin America & Caribbean    -0.373    0.262 
   (0.58)    (0.35) 
North America    2.431     
   (3.67)***     
Western Europe    1.604     
   (2.31)**     
Sample all  all  developing  developing 
Countries 143  143  120  120 
Observations 2234  2234  1776  1776 
Pseudo R-squared  0.25  0.28  0.13  0.15 
 
Notes: Absolute z-values in parentheses. Year-specific time dummies included, but 
not reported. Standard errors adjusted for clustering on country. 
*  significant at .1 level  ** at .05 level  *** at .01 level. 
 
39 Table 4. Random-effects IV estimation results for women’s economic rights. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
TRADE/GDP 0.004  0.010  0.005  0.007 
 (1.80)*  (1.78)*  (1.70)*  (0.89) 
FDISTOCK/GDP -0.001  -0.015  -0.003  0.001 
 (0.15)  (0.83)  (0.40)  (0.03) 
ln GDPPC  0.312  -0.012  0.118  -0.220 
 (4.29)***  (0.07)  (0.99)  (0.86) 
DEMOCRACY -0.002  0.010  0.005  -0.000 
 (0.17)  (0.56)  (0.38)  (0.00) 
GOVLEFT 0.101  0.137  0.138  0.142 
 (2.98)***  (2.46)**  (2.96)***  (1.60) 
%MUSLIM -0.003  -0.004  -0.003  -0.004 
 (3.38)***  (1.83)*  (2.74)***  (1.60) 
CONV100RAT 0.003  0.036  0.028  0.033 
 (0.06)  (0.47)  (0.43)  (0.38) 
CONV111RAT 0.050  0.028  0.007  -0.035 
 (0.88)  (0.41)  (0.10)  (0.44) 
East Asia & Pacific    0.048    -0.211 
   (0.19)    (0.52) 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia    -0.260    0.013 
   (0.71)    (0.03) 
Sub-Saharan Africa    -0.231    -0.479 
   (0.69)    (1.07) 
South Asia    -0.272    -0.313 
   (0.69)    (0.61) 
Latin America & Caribbean    0.061    0.047 
   (0.25)    (0.14) 
North America    0.951     
   (1.99)**     
Western Europe    0.471     
   (1.96)*     
Sample all  all  developing  developing 
Countries 143  143  120  120 
Observations 2234  2234  1776  1776 
R-squared (overall)  0.35  0.26  0.16  0.09 
 
Notes: Absolute z-values in parentheses. Year-specific time dummies included, but 
not reported. *  significant at .1 level  ** at .05 level  *** at .01 level. 
40 Table 5. Negative binomial estimation results for forced labor incidence. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Kucera  Kucera  Busse  & Braun  Busse & Braun 
TRADE/GDP -0.026  -0.030  -0.012  -0.012 
 (3.20)***  (3.27)***  (2.38)**  (2.25)** 
FDISTOCK/GDP 0.009  0.013  -0.010  -0.010 
 (0.61)  (0.87)  (0.85)  (0.84) 
ln GDPPC  -0.291  -0.278  -0.133  -0.128 
 (1.26)  (1.18)  (0.89)  (0.86) 
DEMOCRACY 0.204 0.206  -0.060  -0.062 
 (1.90)*  (1.90)*  (0.67)  (0.70) 
GOVLEFT 0.398  0.418  0.195 0.216 
 (0.97)  (1.00)  (0.71)  (0.76) 
CONV29RAT 0.722  0.689  0.428  0.406 
 (1.70)*  (1.56)  (1.46)  (1.38) 
CONV105RAT -0.623 -0.706  -0.346  -0.314 
 (1.52)  (1.65)*  (1.36)  (1.22) 
OECD -1.027    -1.825   
 (1.29)    (2.48)**   
Constant 3.213  3.321  1.050  0.964 
 (1.51)  (1.52)  (0.69)  (0.64) 
Sample all  developing  all  developing 
Observations 135  112  128  105 
Pseudo R-squared  0.11  0.11  0.15  0.09 
 
Notes: Absolute z-values in parentheses. Standard errors robust towards arbitrary 
heteroscedasticity. *  significant at .1 level  ** at .05 level  *** at .01 level. 
 
41 Table 6. IV estimation results for forced labor incidence. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Kucera  Kucera  Busse  & Braun  Busse & Braun 
TRADE/GDP -0.011  -0.012  -0.011  -0.011 
 (2.14)**  (2.22)**  (2.36)**  (2.47)** 
FDISTOCK/GDP -0.000  0.000  0.002  -0.000 
 (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.11)  (0.02) 
ln GDPPC  0.220  0.018  0.432  0.315 
 (0.79)  (0.08)  (1.72)*  (1.40) 
DEMOCRACY 0.005  0.067  -0.154  -0.121 
 (0.07)  (1.01)  (1.97)**  (1.60) 
GOVLEFT 0.283  0.289  0.254  0.325 
 (1.34)  (1.36)  (1.23)  (1.49) 
CONV29RAT 0.358  0.388  0.306 0.319 
 (1.91)*  (1.91)*  (1.76)*  (1.73)* 
CONV105RAT -0.307  -0.406  -0.263  -0.297 
 (1.46)  (1.78)*  (1.37)  (1.54) 
OECD -0.699    -0.967   
 (1.53)    (2.36)**   
Constant -0.690  1.253  -2.795  -1.694 
 (0.29)  (0.66)  (1.29)  (0.86) 
Sample all  developing  all  developing 
Observations 135  112  128 105 
R-squared 0.10  0.17  0.29  0.37 











Notes: Absolute z-values in parentheses. Standard errors robust towards arbitrary 
heteroscedasticity. *  significant at .1 level  ** at .05 level  *** at .01 level. 
Hansen J statistic over-identification test is asymptotically chi-sq distributed under the 
null of exogeneity, with p-values reported in brackets. 







Forced labor incidence 
(Busse and Braun) 
Afghanistan 0.00  0   
Albania 1.00  0  0.5 
Algeria 1.00  0  0 
Angola 1.07  0  0.5 
Argentina 1.30  0  0 
Armenia 0.91  0  1 
Australia 1.95  0  0 
Austria 1.68  1  0 
Azerbaijan 1.09  0  0 
Bahamas, The    0 0 
Bahrain 1.14  0   
Bangladesh 0.59  1  2.5 
Barbados    0 0 
Belarus 1.27  0  1 
Belgium 2.05  0  0 
Belize 1.64  0  0 
Benin 1.41  1  3.5 
Bhutan 1.41  0   
Bolivia 0.91  1  1 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  2.00  2   
Botswana 1.10  0  0 
Brazil 1.09  4  1.5 
Brunei 0.95  0   
Bulgaria 1.32  2  0.5 
Burkina Faso  0.41  0  0.5 
Burundi 1.26  0  0 
Cambodia 0.85  3  2 
Cameroon 1.06  0  0.5 
Canada 2.23  0  0 
Cape Verde    0 0 
Central African Republic  0.86  0  0.5 
Chad 0.88  1  0 
Chile 1.33  0  0 
China 1.00  1  1.5 
Colombia 1.27  1  0 
Comoros    0  
Congo, Dem. Rep.  0.92  0  1 
Congo, Rep.  1.00  1  0 
Costa Rica  2.18  0  0.5 
Cote d'Ivoire  1.32  0  3.5 
Croatia 1.55  0  0 
Cuba 1.71  1   
Cyprus 1.59  0  0 
Czech Republic  1.82  0  0 
Denmark 2.05  0  0 
Djibouti     0 
Dominican Republic  1.59  0  1.5 
Ecuador 1.09  0  0 
43 Egypt, Arab Rep.  1.09  0  0 
El Salvador  1.23  0  0.5 
Equatorial Guinea    0  
Eritrea 1.00  0   
Estonia 2.09  0  0.5 
Ethiopia 0.95  0  0.5 
Fiji 1.45  0  0 
Finland 2.55  0  0 
France 2.14  0  0 
Gabon 1.27  1  0.5 
Gambia, The  1.05  0  0 
Georgia 1.27  0   
Germany 2.18  1  0 
Ghana 1.64  0  0 
Greece 1.86  0  1 
Guatemala 1.00  0  1.5 
Guinea 1.45  0  0.5 
Guinea-Bissau 1.00  2   
Guyana 1.36  0  0 
Haiti 1.29  0  2.5 
Honduras 1.27  0  0.5 
Hong Kong, China    0  
Hungary 2.05  0  0.5 
Iceland 2.05  0  0 
India 0.95  4  2.5 
Indonesia 1.18  1  3 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  0.00  0  1 
Iraq 1.18  0   
Ireland 2.00  0  0 
Israel 2.00  0  0.5 
Italy 1.82  0  0 
Jamaica 1.68  0  0 
Japan 1.14  0  0.5 
Jordan 1.09  0  0 
Kazakhstan 1.00  0  0.5 
Kenya 1.00  0  0.5 
Korea, Dem. Rep.  1.00  0   
Korea, Rep.  0.95  0  0 
Kuwait 0.62  0   
Kyrgyz Republic  2.18  0  1 
Lao PDR  1.10  0   
Latvia 1.45  0  0.5 
Lebanon 1.00  0  1 
Lesotho 0.33  0  0 
Liberia 0.94  2   
Libya 0.86  0   
Lithuania 2.00  0  0 
Luxembourg 2.32  0  0 
Macao, China    0  
Macedonia, FYR  1.20  0  0 
Madagascar 1.82  0  1 
Malawi 1.00  1  0 
Malaysia 1.33  0  0.5 
Maldives    0 0 
44 Mali 0.76  1  0.5 
Malta    0 0 
Mauritania 1.27  0  1 
Mauritius 1.09  0  0 
Mexico 1.23  0  1.5 
Moldova 1.45  0  0.5 
Mongolia 1.95  0  0 
Morocco 0.91  0  0.5 
Mozambique 1.09  0  0 
Myanmar 1.30  1   
Namibia 1.24  1   
Nepal 1.00  1  2.5 
Netherlands 2.23  0  0 
New Zealand  2.05  0  0 
Nicaragua 1.15  1  0 
Niger 1.05  0  0 
Nigeria 0.64  0  0.5 
Norway 2.00  0  0 
Oman 0.91  0   
Pakistan 0.36  4  2.5 
Panama 1.27  0  0 
Papua New Guinea  1.27  0  0 
Paraguay 1.00  0  1 
Peru 1.32  1  1 
Philippines 1.33  1  1.5 
Poland 1.38  0  0 
Portugal 2.00  0  0 
Qatar    0  
Romania 1.55  0  0.5 
Russian Federation  1.00  0  1 
Rwanda 1.00  0   
Samoa     0 
Saudi Arabia  0.05  0   
Senegal 1.27  0  0.5 
Seychelles     0 
Sierra Leone  0.94  0  2 
Singapore 1.55  0  0.5 
Slovak Republic  1.40  0  0 
Slovenia 2.00  0  0.5 
Solomon Islands    0  
Somalia 0.83  1   
South Africa  1.05  0  0.5 
Spain 1.73  0  0 
Sri Lanka  1.05  2  2.5 
Sudan 0.62  1  2 
Suriname    0  
Swaziland 1.00  0  0 
Sweden 2.41  0  0 
Switzerland 2.00  0  0 
Syrian Arab Republic  1.09  0  0 
Tajikistan 1.20  0   
Tanzania 1.05  0  1 
Thailand 1.59  2  0.5 
Togo 1.23  0  1.5 
45 Trinidad and Tobago  2.14  0  0 
Tunisia 1.45  0  0 
Turkey 1.45  0  1 
Turkmenistan 1.00  0   
Uganda 0.53  2  0.5 
Ukraine 1.09  0  0.5 
United Arab Emirates  1.18  0   
United Kingdom  2.00  1  0 
United States  2.00  0  0 
Uruguay 1.00  0  0 
Uzbekistan 1.00  1  0 
Vanuatu     0 
Venezuela, RB  1.86  0   
Vietnam 1.28  0  0.5 
Yemen, Rep.  0.68  0   
Yugoslavia, FR (Serbia/Montenegro)  1.48  0   
Zambia 1.00  0  0 
Zimbabwe 0.95  0  0 
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